To shutdown, or not to shutdown?

Chuck Schumer is finding he has an awful lot in common John Boehner.

As the fiscal-year deadline approaches at the end of this month Senate Democrats face a choice. Senate procedures enable the Democratic minority to filibuster any funding deal, forcing Republicans to find 60 votes or face a government shutdown. As a result, Majority Leader Schumer and his divided Democratic caucus must decide whether to capitulate (again), negotiate, or intentionally shutter the government. And while there are several arguments for and against shutdowns, the fact is it maybe unavoidable even if Democrats know they will lose. A shutdown is likely not because there’s a secret electoral calculation or a magic message that will flip public opinion in their favor. Those arguments rest on very flimsy assumptions. Instead, a shutdown is likely because Democratic politics are so divided.

To start, let’s get this out of the way: shutdowns are terrible legislative tactics. The party causing it takes a hit in the polls and wins nothing while doing it. In 2013, Republicans used a shutdown in an attempt to defund the ACA. They lost. President Trump shut down the government in 2018 to elicit border wall money from Congress. It resulted in the longest shutdown in American history and no additional border wall money. It is among the most high-profile ways a congressional party can fail. This is essentially established fact by now. If you believed the various House Republican shutdowns were unnecessary, self-inflicted disasters – and pretty much everyone did – Democrats would be committing the same mistake.

Yet, this once universal view on the Democratic side of the aisle has shifted recently. President Trump’s refusal to spend appropriated dollars, dismantling of an executive agency, among various other violations of constitutional norms and text has substantially changed the playing field. Democratic-leaning commentators now argue a shutdown is necessary. Democrats could win a smaller policy even if they lose on their bigger ambitions - like extending healthcare tax credits. Or, forcing a shutdown could create an opportunity for Democrats to highlight the seriousness of the moment and engage in opposition it deserves if they can craft the right message. Doing something now is better than doing nothing.

However, neither would “win” the shutdown. Negotiating to prevent a shutdown or to avert one is not necessarily rewarding. This tactic assumes that policy (at least in part) leads to electoral success. That’s not a great assumption. One, the policy win is likely to be modest or affect a small percentage of the public. Two, almost by definition very few voters are likely to mobilize because of it or base their future vote choice on said policy. Three, few people would have the wherewithal to accurately attribute a status-quo-extending benefit to Democratic Party efforts in Congress. Four, Republicans are just as likely to claim credit for the policy. Tax-credit extensions are a good example. It lacks broad salience and is disconnected from the main sources of Democratic anger, which include but are not limited to impoundments, violations of the rule of law, ICE raids, National Guard mobilizations in cities, among many others. Democrats may win the tax credits regardless, mostly because Republicans appear most open to offering them. That would produce a meaningful positive change to people’s lives. But it would not address Democratic grievances. To make this the center-piece of a shutdown functionally serving to defend democracy is disconnected, at best, and unlikely to satisfy the base clamoring for a showdown.

Gauging the electoral consequences of previous shutdowns is where it gets tricky. Republicans took significant hits in the polls in 2013 and 2018-2019. If party brand matters, Democrats certainly would not want to make it worse than it already is. Yet, there was no obvious electoral penalty after previous shutdowns. The 1995 shutdown arguably helped Clinton in 1996 but Republicans retained their narrow House and Senate majorities. In 2014 midterm was a near-landslide for Republicans, adding 13 seats in the House and 9 seats in the Senate. If the shutdown occurred in an even numbered year, it might be different. But odd-year shutdowns haven’t had the electoral consequences some fear.

On the other hand, a shutdown does risk mobilizing the opposition. Democrats’ impeachment push of 2019 boosted Trump’s bad polling to a more respectable level. President Trump’s 2018-2019 shutdown spurred a near-united front among Democrats in the 116^th Congress. Aggressive partisan tactics often triggers partisan backlash and consolidates their support. A Democratic shutdown could unify a fractured Republican majority. All things being equal, that is not a good legislative strategy.

Ultimately, however, electoral, policy, or messaging politics miss why a shutdown may be unavoidable. At this point, it may be the only way Democratic leaders can manage internal Democratic politics.

The Democratic Party deeply divided and in very poor shape. After Schumer’s capitulation in March, the Democratic base has turned on the party. Fundraising is down. Democrats public approval is at a 30-year low largely because its voters disapprove of their leaders handling of Trump 2.0. Both caucuses suffer divisions on strategy, tactics, purpose, and policies. Democrats are grappling with fundamental questions about the direction and goals of the party. Today’s congressional Democrats look a lot like the Republican majorities after the 2010 Tea Party wave. Its leaders – Schumer in particular – face the same questions Republican speakers faced during that time: are the party’s leaders representing constituents’ demands?

At the moment, the answer is no mostly because leading a divided caucus is thankless at best and near impossible at worst. Speaker John Boehner shut down – or nearly shut down – parts of the government on a few occasions just to allow his most vocal wing an opportunity to oppose President Obama. Speaker Paul Ryan struggled mightily with immigration policies, fended off bipartisan discharge petitions, and flirted with debt ceiling breaches just to satiate his right flank. Speaker McCarthy was deposed after failing to strike a spending deal and Speaker Johnson has survived multiple motions to vacate after negotiating with President Biden to avert shutdowns. These were not brilliant legislative tactics but those of desperation. When winning was not possible, finding a way to lose became the best way to manage party divisions.

Chuck Schumer is facing the problems well known House Republican leaders. Internal divisions have placed him in a losing position. As a result, coalition management becomes the priority. How can he satisfy members clamoring to oppose Trump and those wary of flagging poll numbers and elections? You pull a John Boehner. Shutdown the government to offer a fig leaf to the a base until defeat is obvious and some face-saving message can be found. (Or maybe you just move on and try to forget it ever happened.)

Put simply, this shutdown decision is a Democratic coalition issue masquerading as a Republican v. Democratic showdown. Democrats will not win a shutdown. So how do you gracefully exit an impossible situation? Jurgen Klopp, Liverpool Football Club’s former manager, once said, “If we fail, then let’s fail in the most beautiful way.” For Chuck Schumer and congressional Democrats, finding the least-worst exit strategy is as critical as it is elusive. It will determine whether Democrats lose completely or just mostly. Regardless, deciding to close the government may be the most rational choice for Schumer. Whether it’s the most rational for the Democratic Party remains to be seen.